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Economic activity among Muslim-women in the UK remains considerably lower and their 
unemployment rate significantly higher than among the majority group even after controlling 
for qualifications and other individual characteristics. This study utilises two datasets to 
explore possible factors underlying these differences, such as overseas qualifications, 
language skills and religiosity. It reveals that while religiosity is negatively associated with 
labour market participation among British Christian-White women, economic activity among 
Muslim-women are not negatively affected by high religiosity. Furthermore, family structure 
and the presence of dependent children were among the most important factors explaining the 
latter’s labour market participation although these relationships were moderated by 
qualifications. More women with higher qualifications were economically active even if 
married and with children although some of them experienced greater unemployment, 
probably due to discrimination in recruiting practices and choices and preferences on 
religious grounds. 
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Economic activity among Muslim women in the UK remains considerably lower and their 
unemployment rate significantly higher than among the majority group even after controlling 
for qualifications and other individual characteristics – a situation that is common across many 
European countries (Connor and Koenig, 2015; Koopmans, 2016). Scholars, however, are in 
disagreement in relation to the question of what causes these gaps between Muslim minorities 
and majority groups. Some studies have attributed these gaps to structural barriers including 
discrimination on the grounds of Islamophobia and cultural racism (Ghumman and Ryan, 2013; 
Allen, 2014; Connor and Koenig, 2015; Moosavi, 2015). Others claim that religion, cultural 
norms and sociocultural variables (e.g. language proficiency, interethnic social ties and gender 
values) are more important in explaining the employment gaps between Muslims and majority 
groups in Western countries (Brah, 1993; Dale et al., 2002a; Read, 2004; Fortin, 2005; 
Koopmans, 2016).  
One cannot deny the importance of structural and sociocultural factors in determining the 
labour market outcomes for ethnic and religious minority groups. However, both explanations, 
while shouldn’t be seen as mutually exclusive, seem somewhat partial and inconclusive. Both 
of them leave no room for agency and they pay little attention to the fact that for many minority 
women, their labour market experience is multiply-determined via the intersectionality of 
gender, ethnicity and other identities (Bhopal, 1998a; Choo and Ferree, 2010). Moreover, both 
explanations seem to downplay or even ignore the significance of class in understanding the 
occupational attainment and labour market participation of ethnic and religious minorities. For 
example, a recent study by Li and Heath (2016) has demonstrated that class affects ethnic 
minorities and majority groups alike. One other important pitfall that both explanations face is 
explaining how sociocultural factors, for example religiosity, affect labour market participation 
and unemployment and whether these effects vary between groups and labour market 
outcomes.  
This paper utilises two data sources to analyse the employment patterns among Muslim women 
in the UK: the Labour Force Survey (LFS 2002-2013) and the UK Household Longitudinal 
Study – UKHLS (formally known as Understanding Society – US 2009). It contributes to the 
literature by estimating the effect of factors not previously analysed in similar contexts such as 
religiosity (the importance of religious practice in people’s lives), class backgrounds and 
language proficiency. Hence, this paper provides a fine-tune analysis of the determinants of 
labour force participation and employment among Muslim women in Britain and expands our 
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understanding of the inequality gap between them and majority group women in the British 
labour market.  
 
Cultural and structural perspectives 
Cultural considerations might determine the decision to become economically active; whereas 
finding a job depends primarily on labour market opportunities and employers’ tastes and 
practices (Ridgeway, 1997; Darity and Mason, 1998). In a recent study on the relationship 
between motherhood and employment in 19 countries, Boeckmann et al. (2014) have argued 
that policy and cultural contexts are so important in shaping mothers’ employment patterns. 
They found that countries vary not only in their institutional and policy arrangements to support 
working mothers, but also in terms of their cultural values regarding whether mothers should 
return to work or stay at home to provide good maternal care (See also Pfau-Effinger, 2004). 
Most studies on women and labour market tend to focus on motherhood and the birth of the 
first child and consecutive children as the focal point for many women to withdraw from the 
labour market (Gutierrez-Domenech, 2005; Baker, 2010). Because this focal point is also 
culturally determined, we argue here that in some cultures, this focal point might be determined 
at an earlier stage; for example a shift in a marital status (moving from single to married) 
(Bhopal, 1998b), and that there might be more than one junction at which women consider 
their employment status. 
In cultures or religious groups where men are seen as the main breadwinners and women should 
only take care of the home and family, when women get married they are expected to supply 
less labour, especially if they get married to a partner from the same faith group (Lehrer, 1995; 
Heineck, 2004). Additionally, different religions and cultures have different expectations from 
women according to their marital status (Amin and Alam, 2008), in that single women are 
treated differently than married women. For example, within the context of South Asian 
Muslim women, the general expectation is that young women should give up their employment 
once they get married. Those who wish to remain economically active have to negotiate that 
with prospective husbands and the mother-in-law (Dale et al., 2002b). Many of those women 
who succeed to remain in employment after marriage have higher education, but are expected 
to leave employment when they become mothers, which constitutes a second important focal 
point at which economic activity within Muslim women in Britain falls even further. To capture 
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this gender dimension, or the differences between men and women in the way to respond to 
changes in family circumstances, we include Muslim men in the analysis.  
However, obtaining higher qualification and improving human capital can help mitigate the 
effect of conservative cultural norms and practices on the labour force participation of women  
by increasing their market value, especially when there is a growing need for two incomes and 
the erosion in men's earning in the last few decades on the one hand (Becker, 1994; Ranci, 
2010), improve women’s negotiating positions regarding after-marriage economic activity 
(Dale et al., 2002b) on the other hand. Furthermore, it reduces unemployment penalties (author 
2002, author 2013; see also Koopmans, 2016, on the role of socio-cultural assimilation as an 
influence on European Muslim women’s labour market experiences). Language proficiency 
and qualifications that are acquired in the host country constitute a major part of human capital. 
These become crucial factors in increasing the likelihood of labour force participation and also 
enhancing minority women employability when seeking certain jobs. 
 
The effect of religiosity: challenging conventional assumptions 
Many scholars assume that Islam is a key factor in restricting women’s activities outside the 
home including paid work (e.g. see Taraki, 1995; Talbani, 1996; Dagkas and Benn, 2006; 
Spierings, 2014); and that the Islamic view is that women’s roles as wives and mothers should 
precede any others outside the home and in the public sphere (Al-Nabhani, 1999). For example, 
in his recent study on the employment of Muslim women in Muslim countries, Spierings (2016) 
found that in many cases, Sharia law was associated with lower employment rates (p. 190). 
Contrary to this, a number of scholars have pointed out that it is not Islam per se that restricts 
the engagement of women in activities within the public sphere, but it is the way different 
people interpret what does Islam say about certain issues such as whether women are allowed 
to pursue further education or whether they should engage in paid work (Brown 2006). Many 
British Muslim women find that local traditions and various family and community values are 
more restricting than Islam, understanding that Islam gives them more rights than their local 
and ethnically-based cultures. For example, many parents, especially among first generation 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, considered higher education to carry a risk and a negative 
impact in relation to the behaviour of their daughters (Basit, 1997; Ahmad, 2001a; Ijaz and 
Abbas, 2010). Muslim women who wanted to pursue higher education, were able to refute 
some of these concerns by assuming an Islamic identity and by making Islam, rather the 
5 
 
traditional culture, their reference point (Brown, 2006). Some studies suggest that many 
Muslim young women assume an Islamic identity as an empowering strategy enabling 
participation in the public sphere (such as obtaining higher education and subsequently seeking 
employment) and negotiation of traditional family practices such as forced or arranged 
marriages (Dwyer, 2000; Brown, 2006; Becher, 2008; Franceschelli and O’Brien, 2014). 
Contrary to the conventional understanding of religiosity as confining British Muslim women’s 
economic activity (Chadwick and Garrett, 1995), therefore,  we argue that if embracing an 
Islamic identity is not positively associated with labour market participation among Muslim 
women, at least it does not make it lower.  
 
Culture and employment choices and preferences 
Culture, which in this study is measured by religiosity, is likely to influence or restrict women’s 
labour market participation through shaping their norms in relation to the kind of jobs they can 
or cannot do and how they participate in the labour force while adhering to their culture and 
meeting their family obligations (Baker 2002, author 2002). Such restrictions are not exclusive 
to Muslim women (Anker, 1998; Crompton and Harris, 1998; Charles and Grusky, 2004; 
Boeckmann et al., 2014); many non-Muslims take jobs that allow them to meet their caring 
responsibilities (England, 2005). Nevertheless, while Islam does not prevent Muslim women 
working, it certainly directs them towards certain jobs, working hours and labour market 
segments (Spierings et al., 2010) and meeting all these structural and cultural requirements 
reduces their available employment opportunities and places them in  greater risk of 
unemployment or taking jobs of a lower quality than they are qualified to do. 
 
Religiosity and discrimination  
Culture and religion are also linked to Muslim women’s employment prospects by making 
them publicly visible through clothing, language and other social or religious practices. 
Although in a liberal society social and economic rewards should be determined by effort and 
achievement (Kerr et al., 1960), not on the basis of ascription or different categories of 
differentiation (e.g. culture, religion, race, ethnicity, gender and class), within specific 
historical contexts, cultural appearance or religious background not only becomes important in 
a discrete way, but more decisively injects its significance into other social cleavages such as 
gender or class and would also influence the value that is attached to the human capital acquired 
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by Muslim women. In an era of increasing debates in the West over the integration (or lack of 
it) of Muslims and of growing Islamophobia, Muslim women not only have to respond to their 
gender identity (as women) and patriarchical influences (Walby, 1989) but also to the 
consequences of processes of racialization. 
Overall, therefore, we expect Muslim women to be less economically active than Christian 
White-British, but the more religious Muslim women who assume a clear and strong Islamic 
identity are more likely to participate in the labour market than the less religious. Regarding 
the risk of unemployment, Muslim women may face a greater unemployment penalty than the 
majority group, especially if assuming explicit religious identity 
 
Micro-level predictors 
Human capital and skills are key predictors of labour market participation amongst minority-
group women (Bhopal, 1998b; Read and Cohen, 2007; Salway, 2007) as they provide better 
access to the labour market (see Spierings et al., 2010: for the case of women in Muslim 
countries). More importantly, the structure and value of human capital varies considerably 
across generations. The willingness and ability of first generation Muslim women to engage in 
the labour market is likely to be highly restricted due to the lack of language skills, low level 
of education or because of overseas qualifications that are not recognised by British employers 
(Dale et al., 2002a; Man, 2004). 
However, with the substantial improvement in their higher education qualifications (Ahmad, 
2001b), more second and third generation Muslim women born and raised in the UK, with 
English their first language, are becoming economically active, but labour market 
discrimination could keep many of them out of work (Lindley et al., 2006). 
The role of women as economic actors and the gender division of labour is also affected by 
class (Beneria and Sen, 1982; Kibria, 1995; Brah and Phoenix, 2013). Women in white-collar 
jobs are likely to remain in them after marriage and to return after giving birth but young 
women  in blue-collar jobs are less likely to return after marriage (Mammen and Paxson, 2000). 
Furthermore mothers' gender role ideology and work role identity has been associated to their 
daughters' gender role ideology and work identity as adults (Moen et al., 1997). In the analysis 
that follows we set out to examine the following hypotheses:  
1. Muslim women are less likely to be economically active than non-Muslim women and 
particularly than Christian White-British; 
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2. Muslim women are likely to experience labour market disadvantages in terms of their 
employment outcomes more than non-Muslim women; 
3. Strong Islamic identity or religiosity is positively associated with labour market 
participation among Muslim women; 
4. Muslim women with a strong Islamic identity or religiosity are more likely to 
experience unemployment than women with lower religiosity. 
5. Human capital will be positively associated with economic activity while negatively 
associated with unemployment. 
 
Methods, data and analysis strategy 
As indicated, the labour market experience of four groups will be compared with a focus on 
differences between Muslim and Christian White-British; additionally a comparison with 
Hindu women is important because they are among the most successful British non-white 
minorities (author 2009). Furthermore, by including Hindu women in the analysis, we are able 
to examine whether the impact of human capital contributes similarly to the employability of 
minority women, or it varies by religion. Christian White-British women are used as the base 
line in the multivariate analysis, enabling estimation of any disadvantage associated with being 
a Muslim woman. Non-Christian White-British women such as Jews and those with no religion 
are excluded from the analysis. All of the minority ethno-religious groups in this study are 
defined using self-assessed religious affiliation and gender categories. Christian White-British 
women were defined from their self-assigned religious affiliation, ethnicity and gender. 
Data 
Two data sets are deployed. The first, the Labour Force Survey data cover twelve years up to 
2013, providing information on economic activity and unemployment. The large sample 
enables accurate estimates of these alongside a wide range of background variables (such as 
qualifications, family status, the presence of dependent children, gender, ethnic background, 
religion) essential for labour market inequality studies. 
The second, Understanding Society (US), is a longitudinal survey of the members of 
approximately 40,000 UK households and provides information not available within the LFS 
such as the importance of religion (religiosity), whether English is a first language and overseas 
qualifications. The final sample for the multivariate analysis was 3,636 respondents to the 2009 
wave who fell into the four groups selected for analysis; all people in full-time education have 
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been excluded from analysis of the LFS and the US data. Within the analysis we use the LFS 
to collate background information and to describe the labour market situation. The 
Understanding Society data are used in the modelling analysis because of the larger sample 
and greater amount of detail available within it. 
 
Analysis 
The main dependent variable addressed in the later analyses is economic activity status, 
reduced to three categories: in employment, unemployed, and economically inactive; the first 
two constitute the economically active population. 
Because the decision to become economically active and  the subsequent search for a job are 
likely to be responding to different variables, two separate logistic regression models were run, 
one contrasting economically inactive and economically active individuals and the other 
contrasting unemployment with employment among those self-defined as economically active. 
For the first those active were coded as 1 and inactive coded 0; for the other people currently 
unemployed but are seeking employment were coded 1and people in employment 0. 
The independent and control variables used were age, class background, marital status, ethno-
religious-gender background, importance of religion, dependent children, region of residence, 
qualifications, whether English first language, and overseas qualifications, as described in 
Table 1.  
 
Measuring predictors used in the multivariate analysis 
Age was used as a continuous variable, and age squared was included to explore any non-linear 
relationships. For respondents’ class backgrounds we used their fathers’ and mothers’ 
economic activity status when respondents were 14, with three categories; in work, not 
working, and either deceased or not living with respondent. The category of father or mother 
in work was used as the comparator. 
For marital status, two dummy variables have been defined for single and divorced with 
married used as a reference category. A dummy variable of 1 indicated if a woman has 
dependent children and 0 otherwise. Region of residence was used to control for the 
concentration of minorities in London (Peach, 2005). All regions have been recoded into 1. 
London and 0. Rest of the UK. The latter category was used as the comparator. 
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Qualifications were used to represent human capital by introducing a dummy variable: 1 – 
those with tertiary/higher education qualifications and 0 – those with less than tertiary 
education: the reference group is latter group. A further dummy variable contrasted those with 
non-UK and UK qualifications and those for whom English was or was not the first language. 
These last two variables capture most of the impact of whether the respondents were born in 
the UK and the length of stay in the UK. For example, an initial analysis using Chi-square and 
Cramer’s V has revealed a coefficient of 0.79 between English as the first language and country 
of birth (UK versus non-UK). Hence the latter variable was excluded from the analysis. 
Finally a series of dummy variables covers religious affiliation. Muslim women, Muslim men, 
and Hindu women were contrasted with Christian White-British women as the reference group. 
Religiosity was represented from two different variables measuring the importance of religion 
and religious participation (e.g. see Sherkat, 2000; Lehrer, 2004); including both faith and 
practice provide a better predictor. Respondents indicating that religion was important and that 
they have attended religious services at least once a week were coded 1 and all other 
respondents 0. 
 
The samples described 
The descriptive analysis (Table 1) shows that, in the Labour Force Survey (LFS), just over a 
third (37%) of all Muslim women were economically active, compared to 78% for Muslim 
men, 72% for Hindu women and 78% for Christian White-British women. Among the 
economically active, almost one out of every five Muslim women (18%) was unemployed: the 
lowest rate was 4% for Christian White-British women; was 13% and 9% for Muslim men and 
Hindu women respectively. 
Muslim women were on average youngest, at 35 years. About two-thirds of them (68%) were 
mothers for dependent children. Just below a fifth of Muslim women were single, the lowest 
rate among the four groups, whereas their proportion divorced/separated category is similar to 
Christian White-British women (16% and 17% respectively). 
Over a third of Muslim-women, Muslim-men and Hindu-women live in London, compared to 
just 7% among Christian White-British women. Compared to majority group, Muslim-women 
are under-represented among those with higher-education qualifications: only 21%, compared 
to 29% among Muslim-men and 44% among Hindu-women. However, around half of these 
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qualifications among the minority groups were obtained overseas and less than a third of the 
respondents indicated that English is their first language.  
As for the economic status of respondents’ parents when they were aged 14, for all groups most 
fathers were employed, but most Muslim and Hindu mothers were not; most Christian White-
British mothers were in employment. Finally, while 68% pf Muslim-men indicated a high 
religious commitment, only 21% of Muslim women and 24% of Hindu women did so; the 
lowest religiosity is among Christian White-British (13%). It is worth mentioning here that the 
measure of religiosity includes a dimension of belief and a dimension of active/frequent 
participation in religious activities. As Muslim women are not required by Islam to attend 
prayers at the mosque including the Friday prayers (unlike men), being in the category of high 
religiosity mirrors a significant religious commitment by these women. 
 
Marriage, children and labour market participation as shown in the LFS 
The distribution of the economically active population aged 24-45 by marital status, the 
presence of dependent children, qualification level and group shows Muslim women as the 
most polarised group with the economic activity rate ranging from 92% for single women 
holding higher qualifications and with no dependent children to only 21% among poorly-
educated married women with dependent children (Table 2). Compared to Christian White-
British and Muslim-men, there is an apparent greater sensitivity of the labour supply among 
Muslim-women in response to changes in marital status and the presence of dependent 
children. Among them a shift from single to married among those with higher qualification and 
with no children reduces the economic activity rate among Muslim-women by 5 percentage 
points, but it has no apparent impact among Christian White-British or Muslim-men; however, 
the drop among Hindu-women is 12 points. A shift from being a single person with no children 
to married with children among the highly-qualified (the top part of the table) is associated 
with a reduction in the economic activity among all the three women groups; the drop of 35 
points for Muslim-women is substantially greater than that for Hindu (22) and Christian White-
British (13) women. 
Table 2 about here 
Among Muslim-men a shift in their marital status from single to married, especially within the 
less educated population is associated with an increase in their economic activity; the 
percentage of Muslim-men economically-active increases from 75 for single with no children 
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to 88 for case of married with no children, and from 80 for single men with children to 87 for 
married with children. A similar change occurs among Muslim-women but in the opposite 
direction, which suggests a clear gender division of labour – and a difference much greater than 
for either of the other two women groups. 
These results suggest that higher qualifications among Muslim-women aged 24-45 can 
moderate the influence of the traditional gender division of labour, a result that resonates the 
findings of a recent study on the employment of women in 28 Muslim countries (Spierings, 
2016). Other data, not reported in detail here, show that almost all Muslim-girls believe that 
having a job or a career is important and the best way to be independent and had high 
expectations regarding university enrolment.1 They apparently appreciate that in order to 
remain in the labour market after getting married and having children, they need to obtain 
higher qualifications. This probably operates through two mechanisms: it improves women’s 
position to negotiate their after-marriage economic activity with their prospective husbands 
(Dale et al., 2002b); and it increases the market-value of their labour, so that quitting the labour 
market will bring a significant drop in the household income, which many households cannot 
afford. For women with lower qualifications, the reduction in household income resulting from 
leaving the labour market might be smaller than the cost of care and other services and goods 
that are associated with the birth of children, which  removes support for arguments that they 
should remain economically active (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001). 
 
Multivariate analysis 
Determinants of economic activity 
Five logistic regression models have been conducted. The first analyses economic activity 
among the sample without including interaction terms. The second, from which the small 
sample of Hindu women has been excluded, adds an interaction term between ethno-religious 
background and marital status to examine whether marital status differentially impacts on 
economic activity across the groups. The third model includes an interaction term between 
ethno-religious background and the presence of dependent children and the fourth an 
interaction term between ethno-religious background and qualifications, exploring whether 
                                                 
1 These data are taken from Waves 1-6 of the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England; the first wave, 
in 2004, collected data from a sample of 15,770 students aged 13-14 attending 647 different schools, including 
information on aspirations and expectation. 
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education has a different impact across the groups. In the last model an interaction term 
between ethno-religious background and religiosity examines the differential impact of 
religiosity across the groups. Table 3 gives the odds ratio for each variable. 
The first model shows that economic activity increases with age and that those with non-
working mothers were less likely themselves to be economically active (the result is not 
significant for those with non-working fathers). Single people were 17% less likely than those 
married to be economically active, relative to married (an odds ratio of 0.83), and the presence 
of dependent children decreases the odds of economic activity by 75% across all groups. 
Qualifications, and whether these qualifications are UK or overseas, are among the most 
important determinants. People with higher qualifications are more than twice as likely to be 
economically active as those with lesser qualifications. UK-based qualifications significantly 
increase the chances of economic activity by a factor of 2.30 relative to overseas-based 
qualifications and English as a first language, increases them by a factor of 1.38.  
 
Table 3 about here 
Regarding ethno-religious background, Muslim-women are substantially less likely to be 
economically active than Christian White-British women (odds-ratio of 0.62) whereas the ratio 
for Hindu women is 0.88; Muslim-men are more likely to be economically active than Christian 
White-British women (odds-ratio of 1.58). Religious people are 15% less likely than those who 
are less religious to be economically active but this result is not statistically significant. 
In the second model the additional interaction term shows single and divorced/separated 
Muslim women more likely to be economically active than their married counterparts; getting 
married, with other factors controlled for, decreases economic activity among Muslim-women 
and getting divorced or separated  increases it even more (the odds-ratio of the interaction term 
is 2.81). When the interaction term is added the coefficient for separated and divorced women 
is statistically insignificant (with an odds ratio of 1.02);  among women generally being 
divorced or separated is not significantly linked to whether they are economically active, 
compared to those who are married – the relationship is only significant for Muslim women. 
(If both coefficients were significant, all divorced/separated women would be more likely to 




Introduction of interaction terms between the ethno-religious background and the presence of 
dependent children in the third model showed that the odds of economic activity among 
Muslim women with dependent children don’t differ significantly from those for Christian 
White-British (the odds-ratio of 1.05 is insignificant) – a finding in line with previous research 
(Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001; Boeckmann et al., 2014). Muslim men with dependent children 
are very much more likely that Christian White-British women to be economically active 
(odds-ratio of 6.57) and statistically significant.  
 
In the fourth model’s interaction terms between the ethno-religious background and education 
show very similar economic activity rates for women with higher qualifications across the 
groups but Muslim-women with less than higher qualification are 32% less likely than 
Christian White-British to be economically active (odds-ratio=0.68).  
 
The last model interacts ethno-religious background and religiosity, revealing that the main 
effect of religiosity is negatively associated with the odds of economic activity. Because 
religiosity is interacted with the ethno-religious background, the effect of religiosity refers here 
to Christian White-British (odds ratios of 0.74,). Within the less religious respondents, Muslim 
women are significantly less likely to be economically active than Christian White-British 
(odds-ratios of 0.54). However, the interaction term for Muslim women (1.82) suggests that 
among Muslim women, greater religiosity is associated with higher odds of economic activity 
(Predicted probability plots for all of the groups are included in appendix A. 
 
In order to examine this result further and check whether the main effect of religiosity among 
Muslim women is positively associated with economic activity (e.g. increases the likelihood 
of economic activity), we reran the same model, but this time Muslim women were made the 
reference group. The new analysis (not presented here but can be made available upon request) 
yielded an odds ratio of 1.30 among Muslim women, which means that among Muslims, 
religious women are 30% more likely than less religious women to be economically active. 
While this results was statistically insignificant, the interaction term referring to the effect of 
religiosity among British White Christian women was in fact statistically significant (odds-
ratio 0.57). All groups within the less religious category were more likely than Muslim women 
to be economically active. Taken together, these findings suggest that religiosity is associated 
with a lower economic activity within the majority group of British White Christian women, 
whereas is seems to increase the likelihood of economic activity among Muslim women. The 
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lack of statistical significance in relation to the new coefficient of religiosity among Muslim 
women can be interpreted as a lack of effect, however it might also be a result of a sample size. 
Either way, if religiosity is not associated with higher levels of economic activity among 
Muslim women, surely it does not curtail them. 
 
Determinants of unemployment 
Table 4 presents three models for predicting unemployment: the first controls for all the 
variables; the second includes an interaction term between the ethno-religious background and 
qualifications; and the third an interaction term with religiosity. Model 1 indicates significant 
ethno-religious penalties, with all three groups having higher unemployment rates than 
Christian White-British; the difference is greatest for Muslim-women (odds-ratio=5.59); 
Muslim-men are 2.24 and Hindu-women 3.03 times more likely to be unemployed than the 
reference group. 
Table 4 about here 
Age is not significantly related to unemployment rates, but being single or divorced or 
separated increases the odds; the presence of dependent children decreases them. Higher 
qualifications, UK-based qualifications and English as the first language contribute to a lower 
unemployment levels, but religiosity does not seem to play any significant role. 
Inclusion of an interaction between qualifications and the ethno-religious background shows 
that while higher qualifications among Christian White-British decrease the odds of 
unemployment (odds-ratios of 0.25,), Muslim women with higher qualifications experience a 
greater risk of unemployment suggesting that their qualifications have a lower value for 
employers and give them less protection from unemployment (odds-ratios of 2.11 for the 
interaction and 3.21 for the Muslim women category).  Although both coefficients are 
statistically insignificant, it seems that in the sample there is a clear effect, but that due to small 
sample sizes it is difficult to conclude whether this will be found in the larger population. 
Model 3 interacts religiosity with ethno-religious background. Religiosity among Christian 
White-British women is insignificant and plays no apparent role in affecting the risk of 
unemployment. Among the less religious respondents (the main effect of Muslim women 
relative to the majority group), being a Muslim woman increases the odds of unemployment 
by 5.68. There is an additional increase of 1.90 for those in the category of high religiosity 
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which suggests that Muslim women incur an additional unemployment penalty if they are also 
religious or assume a strong Islamic identity. The effect for Muslim men is much lower and 
they do not seem to experience an additional penalty due to religiosity. We have further 
scrutinised the effect of religiosity by rerunning the third model with Muslim women as the 
reference group. The new analysis generated a coefficient of 1.78 for the main effect (among 
Muslim women) and a coefficient of 0.53 for the interaction between religiosity and British 
White Christian women. This suggests that the odds of religious Muslim women to face 
unemployment are 78% higher than the odds of non-religious Muslim women. These odds are 
lower for the majority British women. Although this result shows a clear effect of religiosity, 
the lack of statistical significance makes difficult to conclude whether this will be found in the 
larger population. 
Discussion and conclusions 
This study has explored employment patterns of Muslim women in the UK. Data obtained from 
the LFS showed how patterns of family formation, the presence of dependent children and 
education shape the likelihood of labour market participation across the four groups studied 
and data from Understanding Society depicted how women in particular groups have higher 
labour market participation rates than others and what makes them less or more employable. 
Patterns of family formation, and the gender division of labour strongly associated with it, were 
among the most important factors explaining different labour market participation of Muslim-
women from the Christian White-British majority. The former face two junctures at which they 
may exit the labour market: when they get married, and when they become mothers. Most 
women are likely to leave the labour market after giving birth, but the length of their leave is 
highly influenced by local cultures, institutional arrangements and policies that support 
mothers; these analyses show that Muslim-women were no exception, but unlike Christian 
White-British women, and to lesser extent Hindu-women, their labour market participation 
dropped significantly after marriage as well as after child-bearing – two falls both accompanied 
by an increase of labour market participation among Muslim men confirming a strong gender 
division of labour among Muslims (Read, 2003; Read, 2004; Spierings et al., 2010; Spierings, 
2014). 
The findings have however also provided some evidence that the impact of family formation, 
the presence of dependent children and the gender division of labour on Muslim-women’s 
labour force participation was to some extent moderated by education; those with higher 
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qualifications were able to remain more economically active despite getting married and having 
children than those with less, suggesting that qualifications improve women’s position to 
negotiate their after-marriage economic activity with their prospective husbands and increases 
the market-value of their labour. It is worth noting though, as suggested by Spierings (2016) 
that the influence of the family structure on the employment of Muslim women is not limited 
to only having children and being married, but spills beyond that. The presence of elderly 
people (e.g. parents) within the family and whether the family is an extended unit rather a 
nuclear unit are likely to affect women’s supply of labour (Brah 1993).  
Furthermore, not only was education important in determining the labour market participation 
of women in general and Muslim-women in particular, but whether these qualifications have 
been obtained in the UK and whether English was their first language confirm our hypothesis 
in relation to the positive impact of these factors and lends support to previous studies. 
One of the most interesting findings was the differential impact of religiosity across the groups. 
The general pattern among the majority group of Christian White-British was in line with 
previous studies showing that high commitment to religion (religiosity) leads to lower levels 
of labour market participation, as with the case of Mormon and conservative Protestant (Lehrer, 
1995; Sherkat, 2000; Lehrer, 2004). This suggests that Christian women who are highly 
committed to their faith are likely to prioritise their traditional female roles as mothers who 
prefer to stay at home for their children rather than remain economically active. However, and 
interestingly, high religiosity was not associated with lower levels of labour market 
participation among British Muslim women. Contrary to the general negative effect of 
religiosity on women’s economic activity, the case of Muslim women in Britain challenges the 
well accepted assumption that religiosity would lead to lower labour market participation 
including among Muslim women such as in countries like Indonesia and Nigeria (Spierings, 
2014). 
This finding lends support to the argument that has been made in a number of qualitative studies 
in the UK regarding the empowering impact of Islam (Dwyer, 2000; Brown, 2006; 
Franceschelli and O’Brien, 2014). Indeed, the positive impact of religiosity on the labour 
market participation of Muslim women provides further evidence for the argument that a strong 
Islamic identity is used as a strategy to resist various cultural practices (e.g. forced and arranged 
marriages) and to realise rights of education and employment.  
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While assuming a strong Islamic identity might have helped Muslim women in the UK 
overcome the restrictions imposed on them by their local and ethnic cultures, this process has 
not gone without undesirable implications, especially in relation to the wider society and 
particularly potential employers in the UK mainstream labour market. Adopting a strong 
Islamic identity will certainly mean, at least for most religiously committed Muslim women, 
wearing the hijab. Previous studies have shown that Muslim women who wear the hijab face 
discrimination and hostility and many employers would prefer not to employ them (Franks, 
2000; Ghumman and Ryan, 2013). This study confirms the greater risk associated with 
religiosity among Muslim women and higher unemployment levels are probably due to 
discrimination in recruiting and hiring practices especially among Muslim women. However, 
other parts of this unemployment penalty might be associated with Muslim-women’s choices 
and preferences on religious grounds and their lack of willingness to do any job, especially if 
these jobs clash with their faith (e.g. handling alcohol or if modesty is compromised). 
Furthermore, Muslim women with higher qualifications might have higher occupational 
expectations than other Muslim women or other Christian White-British, and as a result they 
are unwilling to accept any job. Given their narrower range of occupational opportunities (due 
to different choices and preferences on religious grounds and employers’ practices) they are 
likely to end up with fewer opportunities over which they compete against each other and of 
course against other groups. Hence, they experience a substantially higher rate of 
unemployment. 
Although the measure of religiosity included both strength and practice of faith, for Muslim 
women information on clothing (whether they wear a hijab) could have significantly improved 
this measure, but unfortunately such information was not available in the dataset. Wearing the 
hijab (or other religious symbols) makes Muslim women more visible and as such exposed to 
greater potential discrimination (though, as Koopmans, 2016, argues, most data used to analyse 
labour market experience – such as those deployed here – provide no explicit evidence that the 
observed differences result from explicit discriminatory practices). Future studies and surveys 
should take this issue into account in order to make a clear inference in relation to the 
unemployment penalty that Muslim-women face in Britain. 
In general, the study highlights the various junctures at which Muslim-women face a labour 
market drop-out (marriage and the presence of children) and how the chances of drop-out at 
each is substantially determined by the level of qualification and religiosity with women with 
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higher qualification and higher religiosity having the highest chances of staying on in the labour 
market. However, those who remain in the labour market tend to experience greater labour 
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Economic activity     
Active 37 78 72 78 
Inactive 64 21 28 22 
Employment     
In-employment 82 87 91 96 
Unemployed 18 13 9 4 
Age (mean) 35 36 37 41 
Marital status     
Single 19 29 20 27 
Divorced/ Separated 16 6 7 17 
Married 65 65 72 56 
Dependent children     
Yes 68 57 46 42 
No 32 43 54 58 
Region     
Inner London 18 17 7 2 
Outer London 18 17 35 5 
Rest of the UK 64 66 58 94 
Qualifications     
Low & high tertiary 21 28 44 30 
Low & high secondary 49 51 44 58 
No qualification 29 22 11 13 
UK qualifications*     
Yes 52 51 48 99 
No 48 49 52 1 
Religiosity*     
High religiosity 21 68 24 13 
Lower or no religiosity 79 32 76 87 
English first language*     
Yes 29 29 28 99 
No 71 71 72 1 
Economic status of father*     
Working 69 75 86 87 
Not working 21 16 8 6 
Deceased or not living with 
respondent 10 9 6 7 
Economic status of mother*     
Working 15 12 34 68 
Not working 83 87 65 30 
Deceased or not living with 
respondent 2 2 1 2 




Table 2: economic activity* (in %) by marital status, dependent children and qualifications, LFS 2002-2013, 









Degree level qualifications     
Single no children 92 95 97 98 
Divorced/separated no children 90 92 100 95 
Married no children 87 95 85 97 
Single with children 87 94 86 87 
Divorced/separated with children 59 100 83 90 
Married with children 57 96 75 85 
Less than a degree     
Single no children 63 75 85 86 
Divorced/separated no children 45 74 62 83 
Married no children 48 88 77 88 
Single with children 33 80 64 62 
Divorced/separated with children 26 67 60 71 
Married with children 21 87 67 76 
* people in FTE were excluded 















Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age 1.54** 1.48** 1.55 1.53** 1.53** 
Age squared 0.99** 0.99** 0.99 0.99** 0.99** 
Father’s economic activity, base=in work      
Not working 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82 
Deceased or not living with respondent 0.24 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 
Mother’s economic activity, base=in work      
Not working 0.80* 0.79* 0.80* 0.80* 0.81* 
Deceased or not living with respondent 1.02 0.94 1.03 1.04 1.02 
      
Marital status, base=married      
Single 0.87 0.99 0.86 0.88 0.87 
Separated/divorced 1.27 1.02 1.24 1.77 1.25 
Dependent Children 0.25** 0.29** 0.24** 0.25** 0.25** 
London 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.12 
Higher qualification 2.36** 2.56** 2.42** 3.09** 2.37** 
UK qualifications 2.30** 2.22** 2.27** 2.31** 2.29** 
English first language 1.38* 1.46* 1.38* 1.36* 1.37* 
Ethnicity, base=Christian White-British      
Muslim women 0.62** 0.54** 0.59* 0.68 0.54** 
Muslim men 1.58* 2.47** 1.45 2.96* 1.53 
Hindu women 0.88  0.86 1.02 0.91 
Religiosity 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.74* 
Interaction: ethnicity X marital status      
Muslim women X single  1.44    
Muslim women X divorced /separated  2.81*    
Muslim men X single  0.36**    
Muslim men X divorced /separated  1.92    
Interaction: ethnicity X dependent children      
Muslim women X dependent children   1.05   
Muslim men X dependent children   6.57*   
Hindu women X dependent children   1.00   
Interaction: ethnicity X higher 
qualifications 
     
Muslim women X higher qualifications    0.92  
Muslim men X higher qualifications     0.49  
Hindu women X higher qualifications    0.85  
Interaction: ethnicity X religiosity      
Muslim women X religiosity     1.82* 
Muslim men X religiosity     1.14 
Hindu women X religiosity     0.77 
Likelihood Ratio Tests χ²= 597.25 
χ²= 
560.93 
χ²= 602.96 χ²= 600.94 χ²= 603.03 
P value p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Cox and Snell 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 




Table 4: Logistic regression (odds-ratios) for predicting unemployment, US 2009, N=2,643  
  






 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.55 0.56 0.34 
Age 0.93 0.95 0.94 
Age squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Marital status, base=married    
Single 1.90** 2.30** 2.32** 
Separated/divorced 2.24** 2.23** 2.19** 
Dependent Children 0.57* 0.69 0.68 
London 0.95 0.80 0.79 
Higher qualification 0.56* 0.25* 0.51* 
UK qualifications 0.42** 0.44** 0.44** 
English first language 0.75 0.80 0.79 
Ethnicity, base=Christian White-British    
Muslim women 5.59** 3.21 5.68** 
Muslim men 2.24* 1.21 2.83** 
Hindu women 3.03** XX XX 
Religiosity 1.11 1.24 0.94 
Interaction: ethnicity X higher 
qualifications 
   
Muslim women X higher qualifications  2.11  
Muslim men X higher qualifications   2.40  
Hindu women X higher qualifications  XX  
Interaction: ethnicity X religiosity    
Muslim women X religiosity   2.00 
Muslim men X religiosity   1.16 
Hindu women X religiosity    
Likelihood Ratio Tests χ²=194.94 χ²=183.33 χ²=184.02 
P value p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Cox and Snell 0.07 0.07 0.07 




Appendix A: Predicted probability of being economically active by group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
